Metadata of the chapter that will be visualized online Chapter Title Intentionality, Value Disclosure, and Constitution: Stein's Model Copyright Year 2018 Copyright Holder Springer International Publishing AG Corresponding Author Family Name Vendrell Ferran Particle Given Name Íngrid Suffix Division Organization/University Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena Address Marburg, Germany Division Organization/University Address Basel, Switzerland Email ingridvefe@web.de Abstract This article provides an analysis of the phenomenology of affectivity underlying the work of Edith Stein. Taking as point of departure two of her works, The problem of Empathy (1917) and Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities (1922), the paper focuses on the idea that emotions fulfil a cognitive function: they make us accessible the realm of values. The argument of the paper is developed in two sections. The first section offers an overview of Stein's main theses about emotions, feelings, moods and sentiments and places them within the larger framework of the early phenomenological accounts on affectivity. The second section examines the claim that emotions are responsible for grasping values concentrating on two facets of this thesis: the first regards the epistemological question according to which values are grasped by affective phenomena, while the second regards the ontological question about the nature of these grasped values. Keywords (separated by " - ") Intentionality of feelings Emotions Moods Axiological phenomenology Value realism AUTHOR QUERIES Q1 Please Provide complete affiliations for Q1 © Springer International Publishing AG 2018 E. Magrì, D. Moran (eds.), Empathy, Sociality, and Personhood, Contributions To Phenomenology 94, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71096-9_4 Intentionality, Value Disclosure, and Constitution: Stein's Model Íngrid Vendrell Ferran Abstract This article provides an analysis of the phenomenology of affectivity underlying the work of Edith Stein. Taking as point of departure two of her works, The problem of Empathy (1917) and Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities (1922), the paper focuses on the idea that emotions fulfil a cognitive function: they make us accessible the realm of values. The argument of the paper is developed in two sections. The first section offers an overview of Stein's main theses about emotions, feelings, moods and sentiments and places them within the larger framework of the early phenomenological accounts on affectivity. The second section examines the claim that emotions are responsible for grasping values concentrating on two facets of this thesis: the first regards the epistemological question according to which values are grasped by affective phenomena, while the second regards the ontological question about the nature of these grasped values. 1 The Scope of Edith Stein's Philosophical Thought In recent decades, philosophers working on the problem of other minds have shown increasing interest in Edith Stein's work on the nature of empathy. This interest should be welcomed for various reasons. First of all, the study of Stein's work on empathy has contributed to the recovery of an often neglected period of the phenomenological movement known as "early phenomenology," which was led by the first disciples of Husserl and Pfänder and includes authors such as Reinach, ConradMartius , Scheler, Geiger, and Walther-to mention but a few.1 Moreover, the study of Stein's claims about social cognition has led to a perception of her as an original thinker who gave new impulses to Husserl's phenomenology, leaving behind an image of a faithful assistant and the occasional accusation that she contributed to discrediting phenomenology among social scientists.2 As the study of her theory of 1 Cf. for an overview on this movement: Moran and Parker 2015. 2 This accusation was formulated by Schutz: Schutz 1972, 140–141. AU1 Í. Vendrell Ferran (*) Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Marburg, Germany Basel, Switzerland e-mail: ingridvefe@web.de 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 empathy shows, she offered a phenomenological alternative for explaining this phenomenon whose relevance is still alive in the contemporary debate on other minds.3 Last but not least, this recent attention has also contributed to making the analysis offered by other female phenomenologists-such as Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Else Voigtländer, and Gerda Walther-on similar topics, which have until now been eclipsed by the works of their male colleagues, more visible.4 While we should support this new interest in Stein's social ontology and recognise the importance of empathy as a key concept in her philosophical thought, we should also observe that her contribution to the perennial themes of philosophy cannot be reduced to this topic. This revival of Stein's philosophy of empathy-according to my diagnosis-has not been accompanied by a sufficiently accurate study of other aspects of her work. Her philosophical legacy should be revised by contextualizing her claims in a broader framework, which comprises a philosophy of religion, a metaphysics, a theory of the foundation of science, a philosophy of mind, and an investigation of human nature.5 The present paper is conceived against this background and aims to analyze a crucial concept in Stein's understanding of human affectivity. Taking as point of departure two main sources-The Problem of Empathy (1917) and Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities (1922) (the latter containing two treatises "Sentient Causality" and "Individual and Community")-my goal is to shed light on the Steinian idea of the intentionality of feelings and investigate the relationship between emotion and value.6 Focusing on this topic, I hope to show, on the one hand, how Stein's work is placed in the larger context of the Brentanian tradition, how she develops her claims in lively exchange with other members of the early phenomenological group, and how she contributes in an original way to the development of a phenomenology of affectivity. On the other hand, I also aim to present her claims in a way that is fruitful for the contemporary meta-ethical debate on feelings, emotions, and values. It is my conviction that Stein's ideas are as much of a challenge today as they were in the time they were formulated, so that her work can offer new insights in current discussions about human affectivity. This paper is structured in two main sections. The first is devoted to Stein's model of affectivity. Attention will be paid to feeling sensations, general feelings, emotions, moods and sentiments. Following the new paradigm of the affective life inaugurated by Brentano and then refined by his disciples, Stein considers emotions not as mere subjective bodily feelings. Rather, he takes them to be intentional phenomena that both are directed towards an object, and reveal to us what is valuable. A similar view on the emotions as "feeling towards" has been developed in current philosophy within the paradigm of "affective intentionality".7 The second section analyzes two facets of the claim that emotions are intentional states responsible for 3 Cf. Zahavi 2014 and Szanto and Moran 2015. 4 For an overview: Wobbe 1997 and Vendrell Ferran 2008 5 Some recent works on Stein are imbued precisely with this spirit: Calcagno 2007 and Lebech 2009. 6 Cf. for a general overview on Stein's theory of the emotions: Vendrell Ferran 2015. 7 Here I have in mind especially Goldie 2000. Í. Vendrell Ferran 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 disclosing values: the epistemological question about how values are grasped and the ontological question about the nature of these values. I will argue that, while Stein follows Husserl's "a priori of correlation" between intentional objects (noema) and the modes in which they are manifested in consciousness (noesis), she develops correlational research that allows her to defend a singular version of axiological realism. 2 The Intentional Structure of Affectivity: Intricacies and Varieties 2.1 The Intentionality of Affective Phenomena in the Brentanian Tradition This section examines the intricacies and varieties of the intentional structure of affectivity in Stein's model of the mind. I begin embedding her work in the Brentanian tradition of intentionality, and then in Sect. 2.2 I focus in on her model of affectivity and especially her theory of emotions.8 As is well known, with the publication of Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (1874) Brentano re-introduced the idea of an intentional reference or intentional in-existence. As he famously states at this time, each mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself.9 His theory distinguishes three main forms of intentional reference or "intentional acts": in presentations something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, and in love and hate something is loved or hated (Brentano 2015: 92–93). This third form concerns the broader class of affective phenomena which, according Brentano's innovative view, are forms of being related to an object. Brentano's theory of affectivity rests upon three main pillars, which will be object of scrutiny, criticism, and further development by the members of his school.10 1) The broad extension of "love and hate": According to the first pillar of Brentano's theory, the class of "love and hate" should be broadly conceived so that it comprehends a wide variety of phenomena such as feelings, emotions, desires, intentions, and acts of the will. Brentano gives three arguments in favor of this claim: 8 Cf. For the complexities of the concept of intentionality: Drummond 2003, 65; Searle 2012, 9–22; and Salice 2012, 24. 9 Notice that Brentano has an immanentistic account of intentionality according to which the object is included in the mental phenomenon itself. Therefore, his view differs substantially from later developments of the concept of intentionality which emphasize the idea that mental phenomena are transparent to the world and give us information about it. This difference between Brentano's account and recent account of intentionality has been pointed out by Barry Smith (Smith 1994: 42). 10 Cf. for an account of the shared claims between Brentano and Husserl: Drummond 2003, 84 and Drummond 2013, 52. Intentionality, Value Disclosure, and Constitution: Stein's Model 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 (a) First, he takes the differences among all these phenomena to be only a matter of degree: a gradual transition from one phenomenon of this class to the next is possible. That is, between the feelings of pleasure and pain, on the one hand, and the acts of the will, on the other, there are many transitional phenomena. As he puts it: "Consider the following series, for example: sadness – yearning for the absent good – hope that it will be ours – the desire to bring it about – the courage to make the attempt – the decision to act. The one extreme is a feeling, the other an act of the will; and they may seem to be quite remote from one another. But if we attend to the intermediate members and compare only the adjacent ones we find the closest connections and almost imperceptible transitions throughout" (Brentano 2015: 245–246). To describe this transition Brentano speaks of a "germ" of the striving contained within the yearning. The germ "germinates" when one hopes and "blooms" when one thinks of possibly doing something, has the courage to do so, and finally comes to a decision. With this claim, Brentano is overemphasizing the link between emotions and inclinations to act. (b) Second, all the phenomena of this class reveal an acceptance or rejection of their objects. Analogously to the case of judgments, there is an affirmation or denial of a fact in the case of the emotions, since the content can be agreeable as something good or disagreeable as something bad. The phenomena of this class are "concerned with an object's value or lack thereof" (Brentano 2015: 248). When we desire something, this something has a value for us; when something makes us happy, we love it and we desire its existence. (c) Finally, all the phenomena of this class share the same intentional structure, i.e. the same reference to their objects, which cannot be reduced to the structure of perception or judgment. This reference consists in the opposition between accepting (loving) or rejecting (hating) an object (he distinguishes between joy and sorrow, desire and aversion, striving for and striving against, willing and not willing). These appear with different degrees of intensity, in being morally good or wrong, and in being subjected to the laws of ethics (opposition, intensity, perfection, laws). 2) Cognitive dependence: In Brentano's view, each mental act is a presentation or is grounded in a presentation. This is true for judgments, as well as for the third class of affective phenomena. The immediate consequence of this claim is that all affective phenomena depend upon presentations or judgments. With this claim, Brentano is defending a "cognitive theory of the emotions". Cognitivism of the emotions exists in different versions, but the one defended by Brentano consists in making feelings, emotions, desires, and acts of the will depend upon presentations (such as perceptions and imaginings) and judgments (such as beliefs, suppositions, etc.). The function of these cognitions consists in giving us the object towards which the affective act is directed. To fear something or desire something requires that this something is given to us in a perception, imagining, judgment, supposition, etc. Í. Vendrell Ferran 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 3) Fitting Attitude Theory of Value. As mentioned above, the phenomena of love and hate are concerned with the value of their objects. The third pillar of Brentano's theory which gives an account of what is valuable was further developed in The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong (Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis 1889). In this lecture his aim is to break with the "subjective view of ethics" (Brentano 2009: X). To be valuable is to be the object of an appropriate phenomenon of the third class, i.e. values should be understood in terms of appropriate evaluative attitudes. In support of his claim, he focusses on the analogy between judgments and emotions. This analogy is based on the following tenants. First, the objects of both judgments and emotions are both the object of a presentation and, at the same time, of a pro or contra attitude. In the case of judgment, there is an opposition between affirmation or acceptance, on the one hand, and denial or rejection, on the other. In the case of the emotions there is an opposition between love and hate, inclination and disinclination, and being pleased and being displeased. Second, judgments and emotions may be correct or incorrect. A thing is true when the affirmation relating to it is correct, and a thing is good "when the love relating to it is correct" (Brentano 2009: 18). According to Brentano "the good is that which is worthy of love, that which can be loved with a love that is correct" (Ibid). Something is valuable when it elicits love as something that is lovable. The phenomena of the third class, thus, have appropriate objects. Finally, Brentan holds that human beings have a natural tendency to prefer goodness over badness. We tend to want to avoid error, to prefer the truth, and, in the same sense, to prefer the good over the bad. However, as he recognizes, this analogy is imperfect. In his words: "Everything that is true is equally true; but not everything that is good is equally good" (Brentano 2009: 26). In logic we distinguish between truth and error; but in ethics, what is good appears in degrees: something may be good but it is possible that there is something better. Regarding the later developments of this idea via the members of the Brentano School, three important consequences of Brentano's view should be mentioned here. First, Brentano's position is known as the "fitting attitude theory of values" and has to be distinguished from "robust value realism". For value realism values exist independently of the possible reactions they may elicit in feeling subjects; for Brentano, on the contrary, values are related to the possible reactions of feeling subjects. Second, in this text, the correctness of the emotions is interpreted in terms of "appropriateness" and "fittingness" between them and objective entities which function as their correlates.11 Finally, Brentano distances himself from those theories 11 Cf. For an insightful interpretation of Brentano's concept of the correctness of judgments: see Moran 2000: 31. As Moran points out, during the same year as this lecture, Brentano also gave the lecture "On the Concept of Truth". If we follow the latter, the concept of correctness in the case of the judgments should not be interpreted as a correspondence between mind and world, but rather as an assertion of something based on evidence. The correlates of judgments are thus objective entities. Judgments assert "states of affairs" as existent. To understand this concept of truth, the notion of "evidence" is crucial. Truth is not understood as a correspondence between mind and the Intentionality, Value Disclosure, and Constitution: Stein's Model 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 according to which emotions grasp values. Explicitly in the 1924 edition of his Psychology from an empirical Standpoint, he claims: "I do not believe that anyone will understand me to mean that phenomena belonging to this class are cognitive acts by which we perceive the goodness or badness, value or disvalue of certain objects" (Brentano 2015: 247). He makes clear that he separates the class of the emotions from the class of the judgments, and furthermore he does not assume that the phenomena of the third class presuppose presentations of the good and the bad, or value and disvalue. Brentano's students in their respective works examined and refined these three claims on the intentionality of the affective life and introduced serious modifications. These changes constitute the framework in which Stein built her own model. Here I will mention only those refinements that were influential on Stein's work. 1) Affective and conative phenomena. Despite the general acceptance that the concept of intentionality found among Brentano's pupils, they modified his first claim concerning the unity of the phenomena of "love and hate," introducing a distinction between "affective phenomena" such as feelings and emotions, on the one hand, and "conative phenomena" such as desires and volitions, on the other. The main argument for this distinction is that while conative acts tend to a fulfillment of their goals, this tendency is not inherent for the affective ones (Stumpf 1928, 28; Meinong 1968, 39). 2) Feeling sensations and intentional feelings. The second modification concerns Brentano's claim that intentionality is-to put it in current terminology-the "mark of the mental" (Crane 1998). Most of his students thought that there are mental phenomena that do not show this feature. Specifically for the phenomena of the third class, we should distinguish-as Stumpf, Husserl, and Scheler did- between "intentional feelings" and "feeling sensations" (Husserl 1992, 383; Stumpf 1928, 116; Scheler 1973a: 328). While intentional feelings are directed towards objects and resemble perceptions and judgments, feeling sensations (such as pleasure and pain) may be directed towards the object that is the cause of the sensations, but they are not intrinsically related to them. Further, only emotions have a founded nature, but not bodily feelings, which do not require cognitions in order to take place. 3) Multiplicity of value theories. Despite accepting a general relationship between the feeling subjects and values, the concrete understanding of this relationship was understood by each one of his students in a different way. Some of them, such as Meinong in his first value theory or Ehrenfels in the sphere of ethics, defend a clear-cut value emotivism according to which values are projections of world, but as "fittingness" or "appropriatness" or form of "harmony" between the thing as it appears and the manner of judging about it. In "On the Concept of Truth", Brentano also refers to the class of the emotions by comparing their correctness with the correctness of the judgments. Drawing on Moran's interpretation of the Brentanian account of judgments and truth in 1889, and applying a similar interpretation to the case of the emotions, we can say that Brentano argues in this text that the emotions are directed towards objective entities. Í. Vendrell Ferran 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 our emotions or desires. Others, like Scheler or the late Meinong, will move towards value realism and advocate for different versions of it.12 Stein's model of affectivity can only be fully understood in this larger phenomenological context, which takes Brentano's thought as point of departure and reformulates each of the pillars of his theory of the intentionality of the emotions. 2.2 Stein's Model of Affectivity The criticisms developed by Brentano's students motivate two questions about the intentionality of affective phenomena: Are all affective phenomena intentional? And, in case they show the feature of intentionality: Are all of them intentional in the same way? The idea that in the affective realm intentionality cannot always be interpreted in the same way seems plausible. It is possible that the general experience of being directed towards an object may adopt different forms depending on which affective phenomenon is taking place. Stein's work offers us a way to analyze precisely this case. She offers a very accurate account of how to understand the "intentionality" of different affective phenomena. The model that I present here, however, is an abstraction of her thought. For Stein, experiences always have a twofold structure: as my experience and as a shared experience with others (Lebech 2003, 67). That is, the ontology of the person always includes a reference to the other. For the sake of argument, I will focus only on the philosophy of the individual mind. Stein's affective spectrum comprehends feeling sensations, general feelings, moods, emotions, and sentiments. In line with Scheler and Pfänder, she claims that each one of these phenomena constitutes a stratum of depth of the personality, where the bodily sensations constitute the more superficial strata and the sentiments the more central ones. In what follows, I present Stein's taxonomy of the affective realm. (a) Feeling sensations (also called sensations of feelings and sensual feelings). The first class of affective states is constituted by the bodily sensations of pleasure and pain, which are localizable in concrete parts of the body. They are "affective phenomena" because we feel attracted or repulsed by the objects that arouse them. Following Stumpf and Husserl's criticism of Brentano and in line with Scheler, Stein considers them to be sensations and not "intentional feelings" (Stein 1989, 100; Stein 2000, 163). Pleasure and pain are, thus, not intentional, despite being directed towards the objects that cause them. This causal relation, however, does not reveal an essential link between the affective state and its object. (b) General Feelings. These affect the total condition of the body and cannot be localized in a concrete part of it. Feeling tired, alive, alert, or irritable are 12 Cf. For an overview: Reicher 2009, 122–123 and Vendrell Ferran 2013, 75–85. AU2 Intentionality, Value Disclosure, and Constitution: Stein's Model 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 instances of general feelings, according to Stein (Stein 2000, 19). A similar claim was also developed by Max Scheler, who names such feelings "vital feelings" or "feelings of the lived body" (Scheler 1973a, b, 330). Such feelings manifest a momentary status of the subject and reveal its "lifepower". They show a phenomenal dimension that is unique for each of them. This uniqueness, however, is not reflected in our languages, which are too poor to describe the diversity of qualitative aspects of our affectivity. Despite the fact that these feelings are directed towards vital values, they are not responsible for apprehending them. They just indicate them. Stein introduces a distinction within this class between "feelings of living" ("Lebensgefühle") and "states of living" ("Lebenszustände") (Stein 2000: 21). According to this distinction, it is possible for a state of living to emerge without being felt, so that we do not have consciousness of the experience and, thus, it cannot be considered a feeling. We can be tired (a state of living) without feeling it (a feeling of living). It is also possible for a feeling of living to be given without being accompanied by the corresponding state of living. This is the case when I feel invigorated (a feeling of living) without the state of vigor really being given. (c) Moods. This class is constituted by phenomena like feeling cheerful or depressed that cannot be localized in any part of the body. Moods are a general state of the soul that is not necessarily body-bound. In Stein's view, moods have objective correlates. Comparing them to emotions, she writes: "In joy the subject has something joyous facing him, in fright something frightening, in fear something threatening. Even moods have their objective correlate. For him who is cheerful, the world is bathed in a rosy glow; for him who is depressed, bathed in black. And all this is co-given with acts of feeling as belonging to them" (1989, 92). This passage suggests that emotions such as joy, as well as moods such as being cheerful, are intentionally directed towards the world. The intentional structure of both phenomena, however, is different. Emotions are directed towards values such as the joyous, the frightening, and the threatening, while moods can be characterized by a different kind of intentional reference. Moods constitute the background structure of our experience and are enduring affective states that influence and "colour" the way in which we are directed towards the world. This interpretation puts Stein in line with Husserl, who considers moods to be the emotive background of our experience. In Husserl's view, moods are responsible for the world's appearing to us in a certain light. They are not intentional because they apprehend what is valuable, but because they build the background of our reference to the world.13 The intentionality of moods, thus, can be described as a "background" intentionality and as such substantially differs from the intentionality of the emotions which is directed towards values. Moreover, Stein considers moods to be constituent elements of feelings. Emotions have, thus, "mood ingredients". She observes that each feeling has a "cer13 Cf. for an analysis of moods in Husserl: Melle 2012 and Quepons 2013. AU3 Í. Vendrell Ferran 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 tain mood component that causes the feeling to be spread throughout the 'I' from the feeling's place of origin and fill it up" (Stein 1989, 104). Given that they are the background which constitutes the intentional structure of the emotions, moods form part of the emotion itself. Accordingly, each feeling is characterized by a different mood component. Those feelings with weak mood components are more focused on their objects than those that have a strong mood component. Moods are responsible for the range of emotions we are able to experience and for the degree of focus on an object that each one of these emotions entails. Furthermore, according to Stein, moods may function as dispositions to react. They are able to give direction to our thoughts, feelings, and actions. She writes: "And it's a peculiarity of the feelings that they bequeath to the soul such trenddetermined overall states [...]. This lifted mood implies at the same time a 'disposition' to react in the sense of the original attitude, even where no adequate motive is given for such attitude" (Stein 2000, 217–218). This shows that it is not only beliefs or desires that may influence our actions, but also affective acts such as moods. The idea that affective phenomena may motivate actions can be found implicitly in Brentano's claim that there is only a gradual difference between an emotion and an act of the will. Stein, however, in line with the modifications realized by the early phenomenologists, considers affective and conative acts as phenomena belonging to different classes, which are nevertheless able to influence each other. These three claims, which are the kernel of Stein's philosophy of moods, are relevant for contemporary philosophy in at least two respects. First, the current debate conceives of moods as having secondary importance in contrast with the primacy of emotions.14 On the contrary, Stein's approach shows that the nature of the emotions cannot be fully understood without an account of the relation between emotions and moods. To shed light on the nature of moods implies a better understanding of our emotional responses, given that moods are constituent elements of them. Moreover, it has been common in contemporary debates to consider moods as lacking intentionality, in contrast to the emotions, or, in the same vein, to consider moods as "generalized emotions".15 The Steinian account provides us with another image of this phenomenon: Moods are responsible for giving the world its significance, and in constituting the background of our experience they are deeper than emotions. They show a "background" intentionality which is distinct from the direct intentionality of the emotions, but nevertheless it is a form of being directed towards the world. (d) Emotions-or as Stein calls them, "feelings in the pregnant sense of the word"- build the fourth class of affective phenomena (Stein 1989, 100). Sadness, happiness, and aesthetic appreciation are instances of emotions. The phenomena belonging to this class may be characterized according to two features. On the one hand, they are felt in a specific way and show a phenomenal quality. On the 14 Cf. for an exception to this view in the current debate: Ratcliffe 2013: 353. This author interprets some moods as existential feelings. 15 An exponent of such view is Solomon 1993: 15 and 71. Intentionality, Value Disclosure, and Constitution: Stein's Model 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 other hand, they are intentionally directed towards the world and disclose values. In order to develop this last feature, consider the following example from Stein: Suppose that while I am hearing a report, and thus while this objectivity, 'report', is developing for me into a series in the current of self-generating intellective acts, a joy at this report is beginning to fill me up. 'Joy', this unity of experience, is oriented towards something 'external' to the current. Indeed, it is joy 'at' the report, therefore an 'act'. And something on the objective side corresponds to it: the joyousness of the report, which attaches to it by virtue of its positive value. (Stein 2000, 75) This passage suggests that emotions have a twofold intentional reference. In the example, the emotion of joy is directed towards the report, but it is also directed towards an objective correlate-the joyousness-of the report. Both objects will, in what follows, be the objects of analysis. Emotions are directed towards objects such as material items, animals, persons, and states of affairs. We may feel disgusted by an odor, fear a dog, envy our neighbor, be afraid of a possible third world war, etc. To react emotionally to something requires that this something is given to us. Following the current terminology introduced by Anthony Kenny, we can name these objects "material objects" (Kenny 2003, 132). Embedded in the Brentanian and Husserlian tradition mentioned above, and in line with other phenomenologists such as Pfänder, Stein claims that these objects are given to us in "theoretical acts" (Stein 1989, 98). The material objects of the emotions are given to us thanks to cognitions, i.e. emotions have a founded nature. Stein writes that "it holds true of the "affective acts," as it did of the logical acts, that they are of a founded nature, that they are stance-takings toward an allegedly factual material, that they are 'reactions' of the subject to information of whatever kind which has been imparted to him" (Stein 2000, 157).16 Which are the "theoretical acts" in question? It would be a misreading of Stein's position to claim that only judgments function as "theoretical acts", because in her view different types of "cognitive" phenomena work as bases for the emotions.17 Brentano claimed that emotions depend upon presentations or judgments; Husserl claims that intentional feelings refer to objects or situations that are given in founding objectifying acts; and Pfänder claims that the basis of an emotion can be a perception, an intuitive representation, or even a non-intuitive "thinking in something". In Stein's view, perceptions, imaginings, and deductive thoughts count chiefly as theoretical acts. With this claim, she is defending a cognitive account according to which emotions are based on cognitions and depend upon them. Her version of cognitivism takes a wide range of phenomena into account as intellectual bases for the emotions. This contrasts with some versions of cognitivism developed in the analytic debate in the last decades of the twentieth century, such as, for example, in 16 A similar claim may be found in: Stein 1989, 101 17 Given that it is widely accepted by contemporary philosophers that emotions are based on cognitions, i.e. that emotions have cognitive bases, I speak here of "cognitive phenomena" to interpret Stein's work. The term "cognition", however, in current theories of the emotion is not used with a unitary meaning. Í. Vendrell Ferran 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 the belief–desire theory of the emotions (Green 1992) or those authors that assimilate emotions to a special kind of judgment (Solomon 1993, 126; Nussbaum 2005, 22). Stein's broader cognitivism has advantages compared to these latter approaches. It is able to explain how those emotions that are not based on judgments, such as disgust in face of a perceived object or fear of something merely imagined or supposed, are possible. It is also able to explain the emotions of those beings that do not possess sophisticated forms of cognition but nevertheless react emotionally. Recent developments of analytic philosophers go in a similar direction, avoiding an overintellectualization of the affective life (Goldie 2000; Tappolet 2000). Emotions are not only directed towards "material objects", but also towards values. This claim was shared in one form or another by all the early phenomenologists. As in the example above, joy is directed towards the joyousness of the report. The joyousness is the intentional object of the emotion. To distinguish this kind of object from the "material objects" examined above, I will refer to them using Kenny's widely accepted terminology and speak of "formal objects" (Kenny 2003, 132). The formal object of an emotion is the evaluative category that is related to a material object. In the same sense that perceptions and judgments are objective acts that present an aspect of the world, emotions have their own intentionality, which consists in presenting values. An interesting feature of the formal objects of the emotions is that they are restricted. Despite the fact that we may find different objects, situations, and states of affairs joyful, i.e. that joy may be directed towards different material objects, the emotion of joy is always related to the evaluative category of the joyfulness. In relation to these restricted objects, emotions may thus be appropriate or inappropriate. To feel joy with regard to something dangerous is inappropriate in the same sense that it is in appropriate to feel fear with regard to something joyful. From Brentano Stein inherits the idea that emotions are related to what is valuable. Stein, however, will develop her own version of the relationship between emotions and values. This version of the relationship will occupy me in the last section of this paper. (e) Sentiments. To this category belong gratitude, hatred, and love. The term "sentiment" ("Gesinnung") used by Stein was coined by Pfänder in his Psychologie der Gesinnungen (1913/1916) and was also used by other phenomenologists such as Gerda Walther. According to Stein, sentiments belong to deep strata of the self and are directed towards the personal values of others (Stein 1989, 101). The intentional reference of sentiments is different to the intentional reference of the emotions. Sentiments are characterized by their 'centrifugality', i.e. they "stream" from the subject to the object, bridging the gap between both poles (Pfänder 1913, 362). Moreover, sentiments do not show a hedonic valence: For one who loves, this love may be felt in a painful way, and it is also possible for the hater to feel his hatred with pleasure. This constitutes a difference from the emotions, which oscillate between the poles of pleasure and pain: joy is always pleasant, disgust always unpleasant, etc. We are now able to answer the two questions at the beginning of this section. First, not all affective phenomena are intentional: feeling sensations are a special Intentionality, Value Disclosure, and Constitution: Stein's Model 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 class of sensations and they do not show the feature of intentionality. Second, those affective phenomena considered at first sight as intentional show, on closer inspection, strong differences in their form of being directed towards values: general feelings indicate values without apprehending them, emotions grasp values, moods show a background intentionality and sentiments aim for bridging the gap between subject and object. Stein's model of affectivity is embedded in the Brentanian tradition. She inherits from Brentano the main claims on the intentionality of the affective life, but she also takes into account the modifications of this claim developed by those authors belonging to the phenomenological circles, coming to the conclusion that those phenomena that we call affective belong to different classes and show different modes of intentional reference to the world. In the reminder of this paper I will focus on one of these classes-the emotions-and analyze their relationship to values in Stein's philosophy of mind. 3 Axiological Phenomenology: Stein on the Disclosure of Values 3.1 Emotion and the Feeling of Value as Unified Phenomenon How do emotions achieve their epistemic goal of grasping values? What is the nature of the disclosed values? Both questions-the epistemic and the ontological-will be the objects of analysis in these last sections of the paper. Regarding the epistemic question about the cognitive function of the emotions, Stein's analogy between feeling and perceiving is instructive: "It doesn't see that-just as with perception-a mental apprehension springs up on account of the egoic contents in their "function of manifestation" reveal to the subject the view into a new object world. This new object world, which unfolds before us as we feel, is the world of value" (Stein 2000: 158). On Stein's view, in the same sense that perceiving makes accessible the objects of the physical world such as colors and sounds, the act of feeling makes values accessible to us.18 The analogy between feeling and perceiving used to explain the apprehension of values thanks to affective acts was shared by all the early phenomenologists. Nevertheless, there are prima facie two different versions of this claim. One possibility, defended by Scheler, Geiger, and Ortega y Gasset consists in distinguishing between "feeling" ("Fühlen") as the phenomenon whose function is to disclose values, and "the feelings" ("Gefühle") as those emotional responses that may arise once a value is grasped in an act of feeling (Scheler 1973a, 256; Geiger 1911, 141; Ortega y Gasset 1966, 325). The first of these phenomena-the feeling values- 18 This claim can also be found in the current debate: de Sousa 1987; Tappolet 2000; Johnston 2001. Í. Vendrell Ferran 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 determines our access to the world so that each thinking and willing is conditioned by it. As Scheler claims: "Man, before he is an ens cogitans or an ens volens, is an ens amans" (1973b, 110–111). We first feel values and only afterwards perceive objects, think about them, and have emotions and volitions towards them. An alternative possibility embraced by Stein, which in this point is in line with Husserl, consists in interpreting the act of feeling values and the feelings or emotions aroused by these felt values as two sides of the same coin (Husserl 1992, 404). This claim can be found already in Stein's dissertation when she writes: People want to distinguish between 'feeling' ("Fühlen") and 'the feeling' ("Gefühl"). I do not believe that these two designations indicate different kinds of experiences, but only different 'directions' of the same experience. Feeling is an experience when it gives us an object or else something about an object. The feeling of the same act when it appears to be originating out of the 'I' or unveiling a level of the 'I'. (Stein 1989, 98–99) In this quotation, she has Scheler in mind, despite of not mentioning him directly. In her later work Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities too, Stein defends the same position: "Under the heading of 'feel' or 'feeling' two different things are combined: for one, the acts in which we are confronted with values, with objects as value-endowed, as 'goods'; and apart from that, the attitudes that these values evoke in us" (Stein 2000, 159).19 Like Scheler, Stein claims that values are grasped in an act of feeling. Unlike Scheler, she considers this act of feeling and the emotions aroused by them to be unified so that each time we grasp a value we also experience an emotion. Moreover, in her view there is not a primacy of feeling values over perceiving, thinking, and willing, as becomes clear in the following passage: Every fully constituted object is simultaneously a value-object. Basically, the value-free world of mere things is an abstraction that's suggested to us by the fact that we aren't equally persuaded by all the intentions that can arise on the basis of available material, but rather alternate between different 'orientations'. When oriented theoretically, we see mere things. When axiologically oriented we see values, and in particular, aesthetic, ethical, religious values, and so forth. (Stein 2000, 160) According to this passage, the perception of values is not prior to the perception of things. Both are simultaneously given and it is only a question of our interest or orientation whether we "see" values or "see" things. Stein's idea that the act of feeling and the emotions (the aroused feelings) are two facets of the same phenomenon is very relevant. The claim that both appear to be unified brings her theory close to current positions that define emotions as perceptions of values (the best example of such as position can be found in Tappolet 2000). Nevertheless, the Steinian model keeps the distinction between the act (which grasps or "perceives" values) and the state of feeling (the emotions) open. Keeping the distinction open is important in order to explain those cases in which it is possible to grasp a value without having the corresponding emotion, i.e. without fully reacting to it emotionally. Those theories that assimilate emotions to perceptions of 19 Also in: Stein 2000, 79 Intentionality, Value Disclosure, and Constitution: Stein's Model 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 values, on the contrary, have troubles explaining such cases.20 Stein divides such cases of "empty grasp" into the following three general types21: (a) Absolute lack of value feeling. It is possible to perceive an object without perceiving its value. We can listen to a melody without appreciating its value. In these cases we are completely value-blind. (b) "Cold" value knowledge. It is also possible to perceive an object and know that this object has value because someone told us so or because we learnt it, but not because we feel it. We can notice the generosity of somebody and see this generosity as a motive for gratitude, but be unable to feel this gratitude vividly. We know about the value by the testimony of others or by socialization, but we remain "cold" about it, i.e. we are "empty inside" (Stein 2000, 161). Like the case mentioned before, this is also a case of value-blindness. (c) Partial value feeling. The last possibility consists in perceiving an object, partially feeling its value, but being unable to fully feel it. We have an inner relationship to the value, but we are not inwardly filled up with it. We can perceive the beauty of a landscape and this perception requires a response from us. In this case: "Beauty [...] insists that I inwardly open myself to it and let my inner self be determined by it" (Stein 2000, 159). If the response does not take place then the "beauty doesn't entirely divulge itself to me. The intention inhering in the mere information remains unfulfilled" (Ibid.). This last case suggests that in the Steinian account it is possible to be aware of a value without feeling it fully. She summarizes this possibility as follows: The egoic contents that belong to a complete value-experience are not available here. In spite of that, you can't say that no inner relationship to the value exists. The missing contents are represented by empty places, which are marked off as place-holders for the specific contents, bear within themselves an intention toward those contents and a 'tendency' toward fulfillment by them, and, by virtue of this place-holding, can serve as a basis of the corresponding value-intention. (Stein 2000, 162). Despite the recognition of this possibility, in Stein's view, to fully grasp a value we have to respond to it with a feeling, i.e. with an emotional reaction. Thus, feeling values and responding emotionally to them are normally presented together. This position differs substantially from the one defended by Scheler and other early phenomenologists who defended the separation of feeling and the feelings as two distinct phenomena. A further remark regarding Stein's discussion of cases of "empty grasp" is necessary in order to understand the context of her theory. The concept of value-blindness was one of the topics treated by Max Scheler in his book Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values (Scheler 1973a, 193). It was also one of the main preoccupations of the phenomenological analysis regarding value developed by Dietrich von Hildebrand in Sittlichkeit und ethische Werterkenntnis (1922), whose 20 Cf. For objections against these theories: Mulligan 2004. 21 Lebech adds a fourth case of empty grasp, according to which the grasped value does not exist (Lebech 2009, 266). Í. Vendrell Ferran 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 publication coincides with Stein's Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities (1922). Von Hildebrand distinguishes three forms of moral value blindness: a) total value blindness according to which one is unable to understand what is morally good and what is wrong; b) partial value blindness according to which one is able to understand some values (for instance, the value of good as well as the values of justice, loyalty and so on), but not other (like the values of humility, etc.); and c) subsumption value blindness, which concerns the blindness not of the value types, but rather of the bearers of values (von Hildebrand 1982, 44). Scheler's and von Hildebrand's discussion regarding the possibility of value blindness are motivated by value realism: values exist and it is possible that we are not aware of them. Stein's considerations seem to be in line with these authors. This leads me to the final section of the paper. 3.2 Axiological Realism and Intentional Constitution What is the nature of the grasped values? Stein's position is not easy to place within the phenomenological axiological landscape. This last part of the paper attempts to give some insights about this question and to elaborate a very rough answer. Instead of discussing the virtues or shortcomings of her theory, I will offer in this section an interpretation of her account as embedded in the tradition of value realism. In my opinion, this aspect of her philosophy, that puts her in direct dialog with other early phenomenologists, has not been emphasized enough. In phenomenology two main positions can be distinguished on the nature of values.22 On the one side, in later developments of this movement, authors such as Sartre or Merleau-Ponty defended the claim that values are created by the autonomy of the human being.23 On the other side, we find in early periods a wide spectrum of positions that fall under the label of "value realism" and try to develop Brentano's fitting attitude theory of values in new directions, considering values to be the objective correlates of affective acts. Nevertheless, not all authors endorsed identical versions of axiological realism. Authors like Scheler defended robust versions of this doctrine, according to which values exist independently of the subjects who grasp them and the objects in which they are given. They consider the perception of values to be prior to the perception of their bearers and it is this value perception that determines our thinking and willing. In contrast, Husserl claimed that the subject has an active role in the disclosure of values. According to him, we first have access to the 22 Cf. for an overview of different positions on value in phenomenology: Drummond 2002a, 8 and Drummond 2002b, 29. 23 In his insightful interpretation of Sartre, Strasser claims that Sartre's account of the intentionality of the emotions, rather than being "correlativist", is actually "dynamic" (Strasser 1977, 83–85). For Sartre, in other words, emotions are a magical transformation of the world, but not a form of apprehending values. Rather than being disclosive, the intentionality of the emotions in the Sartrean sense has to do with our world-shaping capacities. Thus, the idea of the appropriateness of the emotions is not one of Sartre's central preoccupations Intentionality, Value Disclosure, and Constitution: Stein's Model 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 objects that are given to us in cognitive acts such as perceptions or judgments, and then we may recognize a value in these objects, i.e. we experience them as valuable. Despite this active role of the subject, however, in Husserl's theory "it remains true [...] that values are disclosed rather than created" (Drummond 2002a, 8). According to my interpretation, Stein's conception of values should be embedded in the early phenomenological tradition of axiological realism.24 Three observations can be made in support of this claim. 1. Vocabulary. In the Empathy book and in her Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, Stein adopts the entire vocabulary of value realism. It is common in both works the use of expressions such as "grasping values" (Stein 2000, 159), "responding to values" (Stein 2000, 159), and "the "discovery" of values" (Stein 2000, 220). This vocabulary suggests that values are disclosed, grasped, endorsed, or discovered by them. As mentioned above, in her view it is also possible that we are "value-blind". 2. Epistemology. As expounded in the last section, values are given to us in acts of feeling, which Stein conceives as emotional responses. If values require a response from feeling subjects, they cannot be created at will. Stein is not defending a creationist account of values: neither a position close to social constructivism, or a form of projectivism and subjectivism. Values are not creations, constructions, or projections of our feelings, they are entities that present to us with enough authority to demand a specific answer. The epistemology of values requires not only that we are "susceptible" to them, but also that we have enough "life power" to experience them, because responding to a value consumes psychic energy (Stein 2000, 220). Values that belong to a higher hierarchy concern us more deeply and they require more energy to be grasped. And it is also possible that some values are accessible only to some individuals who are responsible for discovering them and making them accessible to the community. 3. Objectivity. According to Stein, values are no less objective than the data of the outer world (Stein 2000, 164). The clarification of this last point will take us to the core of the question about the ontological nature of value, and will allow us to develop the Steinian version of value realism. Despite being embedded in the tradition of axiological realism, Stein's version of realism is closer to Husserl than to Scheler.25 Values, for Stein, are "constituted". It is precisely this use of the concept of "constitution," as terminus technicus inherited from Husserl, that plays a central role in explaining how values are objective, for Stein. How to interpret this constitution? A first possibility-rejected by Stein-consists in seeing values as dependent on the objects in which they are given. In this case values would be constituted by the factual qualities of the material objects perceivable by the senses. Beauty would then emerge with respect to qualities of the objects that are perceived by the senses. 24 In this point, my interpretation differs from Lebech, who claims that Stein's theory of values cannot be interpreted as either value realism or subjectivism (Lebech 2010, 139). 25 In the same sense: Lebech 2009, 258. Í. Vendrell Ferran 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 Stein notices, however, that this cannot be the case. First, the same object may be perceived by different individuals without them perceiving it as having the same value-qualities. Second, it is possible that values do come to givenness when extraegoic data do not play any role. This is the case when we perceive the elegance of an argument or when we value a joyful pardon: in neither case are any objects perceived by the senses. Stein concludes that value-qualities cannot be constituted by factual qualities of the objects. When they appear inseparable, this is because a value-constitution goes hand in hand with object-constitution. According to Stein, the intuitive givenness of a thing is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the apprehension of its value. As she states: "Rather, an inner condition of the subject must be added in order to render possible the acquisition of the value" (Stein 2000. 162). Given that values are not intrinsically dependent on the objects by which they are given, the question arises whether they are dependent on egoic contents. In Stein's view, egoic contents have a twofold constitutive function: "One, they are the material on the basis of which values come to givenness for us. And two, they deliver up the stuff for the corresponding affective attitude" (Stein 2000, 160). For example, the feeling of delight provides the basis for the apprehension of the value of beauty of a color and founds my gladness about this value of beauty. Like Husserl, Stein acknowledges that the subject have an active role in the disclosure of values. The idea of the constitution of values means that valuing something always requires the activity of the "I" as a valuing subject.26 This activity of the "I" should not be interpreted as a creation of values by the subject, but as the place making it possible for value to come to givenness. According to the "a priori correlation between noesis and noema" formulated by Husserl, there is a correspondence between experiencing (perceiving, judging, feeling, etc.) and what is experienced (perceived, judged, felt, etc.). For the case of values, this means that there is a correlation between the valuing subject and what is valuable. The correlation between subject and object allows phenomenological research to adopt two different directions of investigation. On the one hand, it is possible to focus on the given phenomena. As Moritz Geiger put it, in this case there is a "turn to the object" (Geiger 1933, 15). This way was mostly followed by early phenomenologists such as Scheler and Geiger. On the other hand, it is possible to prioritize the pole of the subject and consider consciousness in its constitutive dimension. This interpretation is associated with Husserl's transcendental idealism, but its roots can already be traced in his Logical Investigations. Stein's analysis should be placed in line with Husserl, because she explains the constitution of values by examining the valuating subject. At the same time, like other early phenomenologists, she is also interested in the pole of the object: in values themselves as objects of our experience. According to Stein's view, which tries to combine both orientations (the turn to the object and the turn to the subject), the pole of the object-in this case the values-can only be explained regarding the constituting activity of the subject. Constitution, hence, has 26 Cf. for an elucidation of the concept of constitution in Stein: Lebech 2004, 68 and 2009, 267; and in Husserl: Moran and Cohen 2012, 71. Intentionality, Value Disclosure, and Constitution: Stein's Model 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 nothing to do with projection of affective states or creation of values, but with an analysis of the subject as the place that makes it possible for values to appear to us. It is the activity of the subject that confers upon values an intelligible structure. Stein's idea of an intentional constitution of values aims for an understanding of values examining the role of the subject as the space in which the values become possible. The idea of constitution implies that the valuing subject and the values themselves are related to one another, that there is a direction from the subject towards the object, and that in being directed the subject plays an active role: values are dependent on valuing persons and the emotional experiences they are able to arouse. This correlation between the valuing subject and values themselves is central for understanding how the intentionality of the emotions works. Given that emotions are object-directed and that they disclose values, they have conditions of satisfaction. Valuing subjects constitute values but these values are not arbitrarily related to the subjects. That we constitute values implies that we identify them thanks to our emotional experience. Thus, there is a relationship between the "I" and the value that can be considered appropriate or not. Further, values are perceived as higher or lower. Egoic contents may have different significances for the constitution of various realms of value. These different realms correspond to the different strata of the personality and each one is constitutive for a different realm of value (Stein 2000, 163). To sum up: Stein's axiological position should be understood as an original application of phenomenological research that runs in two directions. Given the object of study, namely values, we can say that Stein defends a peculiar form of value realism. Like Scheler, she admits the existence of a realm of values that can be grasped and discovered thanks to our feelings. Unlike Scheler, but in a sense that may also be found in Husserl, Stein thinks that the nature of these values can only be fully understood if we turn to the subject and examine it as the place that makes it possible for the values to be given to us in an intelligible way. This double perspective shows that she takes the phenomenological datum of a correlation between mind and world seriously. Her work can be seen as an attempt to develop a form of value realism within the phenomenological framework of the Husserlian a priori correlation. 4 Concluding Remarks In this paper, I examined the Steinian model of the intentionality of the affective phenomena and focused on the case of the emotions. I embedded Stein's work in the larger framework of the Brentanian tradition on intentionality and the modifications realized by his students in order to explain how our affective acts put us in contact with the world. Stein shared common ground with early phenomenologists in the idea that not all affective phenomena are directed towards their objects in the same way. Regarding the emotions, she develops an interesting account according to which they require cognitive bases to take place and are directed towards the values Í. Vendrell Ferran 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 disclosing them. Taking seriously Husserl's idea of a priori correlation she adopts a realist position about values; these, however, can only be understood under an accurate analysis of the subject. Her analysis reminds us that the objects of our experience cannot be fully understood without a simultaneous analysis of the experiencing subject. This paper was conceived as an attempt to shed light on Stein's claims about the affective life, revitalize her insights, and present her as a philosopher of the emotions whose claims are able to deal with the highly topical matters that still dominate current philosophy of mind.27 References Brentano, Franz. 2009. The origin of our knowledge of right and wrong. New York: Routledge. ---. 2015. Psychology from an empirical standpoint. London: Routledge. Calcagno, Antonio. 2007. The philosophy of Edith stein. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. Crane, Tim. 1998. Intentionality as the mark of the mental. In Contemporary issues in the philosophy of mind, ed. A. O'Hear, 229–251. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. de Sousa, Ronald. 1987. The rationality of emotion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Drummond, John. 2002a. Introduction: The phenomenological tradition and moral philosophy. In Phenomenological approaches to moral philosophy, ed. John J. Drummond and Lester Embree, 1–13. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. ---. 2002b. Aristotelianism and phenomenology. In Phenomenological approaches to moral philosophy, ed. John J. Drummond and Lester Embree, 15–45. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. ---. 2003. The structure of intentionality. In The new Husserl. A critical reader, ed. Donn Welton, 65–92. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. ---. 2013. Exceptional love? In Feeling and value, willing and action. Essays in the context of a phenomenological psychology, ed. M. Ubiali and M. Wehrle, 51–69. Dordrecht: Springer. Geiger, Moritz. 1911. Das Bewusstsein von Gefühlen. Münchener Philosophische Abhandlungen 125–162. ---. 1933. Alexander Pfänders methodische Stellung. In Neue Münchener Philosophische Abhandlungen, ed. E. Heller and F. Löw, 1–16. Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth. Goldie, Peter. 2000. The emotions. A Philosophical Exploration. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Green, O. Harvey. 1992. The emotions. Dordrecht\Boston\London: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Husserl, Edmund. 1992. Logische Untersuchungen, 2 (I). Hamburg: Meiner. Johnston, Mark. 2001. The Authority of Affect. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1): 181–214. Kenny, Anthony. 2003. Action, emotion and will. London: Routledge. Lebech, Mette. 2004. Study guide to Edith Stein's Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities. In Yearbook of the Irish philosophical society, ed. Mette Lebech, 40–76. Maynooth: Irish Philosophical Society. ---. 2009. On the problem of human dignity. A hermeneutical and phenomenological investigation. Würzburg: Königshausen and Neumann. ---. 2010. Stein's phenomenological value theory. In Yearbook of the Irish philosophical society, ed. Julia Hynes, 139–150. Dublin: Irish Philosophical Society. 27 For comments on early drafts of this paper I am grateful to Mete Lebech and Francesc Perenya. I am also thankful to Nicole Osborne for her help correcting my abuses of the English language. AU4 Intentionality, Value Disclosure, and Constitution: Stein's Model 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 Melle, Ulrich. 2012. Husserls deskriptive Erforschung der Gefühlserlebnisse. In Life, subjectivity and art: Essays in honor of Rudolf Bernet, Phaenomenologica 201, ed. R. Breeur and U. Melle, 51–99. Dordrecht: Springer. Moran, Dermot. 2000. Introduction to phenomenology. New York: Routledge. Moran, Dermot, and Joseph Cohen. 2012. The Husserl dictionary. London\New York: Continuum. Moran, Dermot, and Rodney K.B. Parker. 2015. Editors' introduction: Resurrecting the phenomenological movement. Studia Phaenomenologica 15: 11–24. Mulligan, Kevin. 2004. Husserl on the 'logic' of valuing, values and norms. In Fenomenologia della Ragion Practica. L'etica di Edmund Husserl, ed. B. Centi and G. Gigliotti, 177–225. Neapel: Bibliopolis. Nussbaum, Martha. 2005. The upheavals of thought. The intelligence of emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ortega y Gasset, José. 1966. Obras completas. Vol. VI. Madrid: Revista de Occicente. Pfänder, Alexander. 1913/16. Zur Psychologie der Gesinnungen. In Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung I, 325–404 and III, 1–125. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer. Quepons Ramírez, Ignacio. 2013. Intentionality of moods and horizon consciousness in Husserl's phenomenology. In Feeling and value, willing and action. Essays in the context of a phenomenological psychology, ed. M. Ubiali and M. Wehrle, 93–103. Dordrecht: Springer. Ratcliffe, Matthew. 2013. Phenomenology of mood and the meaning of life. In The Oxford handbook of philosophy of emotion, ed. P. Goldie, 349–372. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. Reicher, Maria. 2009. Value facts and value experiences in early phenomenology. In Values and ontology, ed. B. Centi and W. Huemer, 105–135. Frankfurt: Ontos. Salice, Alessandro. 2012. Preface. In Intentionality: Historical and systematic perspectives, ed. A. Salice, 23–28. Munich: Philosophia Verlag. Scheler, Max. 1973a. Formalism in ethics and non-formal ethics of values. Evanston: Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. ---. 1973b. Ordo amoris. In Selected philosophical essays, 98–135. Evanston: Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. Schütz, Alfred. 1972. Collected papers I, the problem of social reality, Phaenomenologica 11. Dordrecht: Springer. Searle, John R. 2012. Foreword. In Intentionality: Historical and systematic perspectives, ed. A. Salice, 9–22. Munich: Philosophia Verlag. Smith, Barry. 1994. Austrian philosophy. The legacy of Franz Brentano. Chicago/La Salle: Open Court. Solomon, Robert C. 1993. The passions: Emotions and the meaning of life. Indianapolis: Hackett. Stein, Edith. 1989. On the problem of empathy: The collected works of Edith stein. Washington: ICS Publications. ---. 2000. Philosophy of psychology and the humanities. Washington: ICS Publications. Strasser, Stephan. 1977. Phenomenology of feeling: An essay on the phenomena of the heart. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press. Stumpf, Carl. 1928. Gefühl und Gefühlsempfindung. Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth. Szanto, Thomas, and Dermot Moran. 2015. Introduction: Empathy and collective intentionality: Edith Stein's social philosophy. Human Studies 38 (4): 445–461. Tappolet, Christine. 2000. Émotions et Valeurs. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Vendrell Ferran, Íngrid. 2008. Emotionen und Sozialität in der frühen Phänomenologie. Über Möglichkeiten von Frauen in der ersten Phase wissenschaftlicher Schulenbildung. Feministische Studien 26 (1): 48–64. ---. 2013. Moralphänomenologie und gegenwärtige Wertphilosophie. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 61 (1): 73–89. ---. 2015. Empathy, emotional sharing and feelings in Stein's early work. Human Studies 38 (4): 481–502. Í. Vendrell Ferran 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 748 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 759 760 761 762 763 764 765 766 767 768 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 Hildebrand, Dietrich von. 1982. Sittlichkeit und ethische Werterkenntnis. Eine Untersuchung über ethische Strukturprobleme. Vallendar-Schönstatt: Patris Verlag. von Meinong, Alexius. 1968. Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werth-Theorie (1894). In Gesamtausgabe III, Abhandlungen zur Werttheorie, Abh. I, 1–244. Graz: Akademische Drucku. Verlagsanstalt. Wobbe, Theresa. 1997. Wahlverwandtschaften. In Die Soziologie und die Frauen auf dem Weg zur Wissenschaft (1890–1933). Frankfurt/M./New York: Campus. Zahavi, Dan. 2014. Empathy and other-directed intentionality. Topoi 33 (1): 129–142. Intentionality, Value Disclosure, and Constitution: Stein's Model 782 783 784 785 786 787 788 789 Author Queries Chapter No.: 4 421425_1_En_4_Chapter Queries Details Required Author's Response AU1 Please Provide complete affiliations for "Vendrell Ferran" AU2 Please provide reference details for "Lebech 2003" AU3 Please confirm a or b. AU4 References "Quepons Ramírez (2013), Schütz (1972)" were not cited anywhere in the text. Please provide a citation or delete the reference from the reference list.